INTRODUCTION
Anti-competitive agreements under the Competition Act, 2002 are in the idea of restrictive trade practices under the preceding MRTP Act, 1969. Such trade practices were uprooted in the consideration of the Monopolies Inquiry Commission (1964) and later on Sachar Committee (1978). The current Competition Act depends on the suggestion of the Raghavan Committee (2002). Section 3 of the Competition Act 2002 articulated that the agreements which interfere with the business opportunity of one or the other party to the agreement to trade unreservedly on the lookout and in the event that the competition unfavorably agreements are known as anti-competitive agreement. An ‘Anti-competitive agreement’ may be described as one, which interferes with the business opportunity of one or the other party to the agreement (or even an outsider) to exchange unreservedly as it would wish. Agreements, which give territorial exclusivity, might be viewed as conceivably anti-competitive on the grounds that the selective arrangement keeps comparable arrangements from being made in a similar area and the supplier rivals his distributor, decreasing intra-brand competition. Where such anti-competitive agreements cause or are probably going to cause a considerable antagonistic impact on competition inside India, it is denied and announced void by Sec. 3 (2). Agreements for price-fixing, restricting the stock of goods or administrations, partitioning the market, and so on, are a portion of the strategies in controlling the market for their potential benefit. However, such agreements would be named as anti-competitive if the competition is unfavorably influenced to a considerable degree.
TYPES OF ANTI-COMPETITIVE AGREEMENTS
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS
Section 3(3) of the Competition Act gives those specific horizontal agreements that are attempted to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition. Nonetheless, such presumption is rebuttable and the weight of confirmation to discharge such presumption will fall upon the person blamed for agreeing to question. In like manner, contentions dependent on counter advantages of agreements might be utilized to remove such a presumption, although this might be trying on account of cartels. Further, the Competition the demonstration gives an exception to this presumption of appreciable adverse effect on competition in the event of horizontal agreements went into via joint endeavors such an agreement will be assumed not to have an appreciable adverse effect on competition on the off chance that it builds effectiveness in production, supply, distribution, storage, acquisition or control of products or provision of administrations.
(a) PRICE AND SUPPLY FIXING-These include all agreements that straightforwardly or indirectly fix the buy or deal price. These include agreements pointed toward limiting or controlling production, supply markets, specialized turn of events, investment, or provision of administrations. On the off chance that strategies identified with price-fixing are received by the parties to manage the competition, it would become workable for them to control the market for their potential benefit and would make an adverse effect on the competition.
(b) MARKET SHARING AGREEMENTS-These include agreements for sharing of markets or wellsprings of production or provision of administrations via allocation of the topographical space of market or sort of goods/administrations or the number of clients in the market or some other comparable way.
(c) BID RIGGING- These are the agreements between contenders that wipe out or reducing competition for offers or adversely affecting or manipulating the way toward bidding. These include tenders submitted because of any joint action or agreement.
VERTICLE AGREEMENTS
Section 3(4) of the Competition Act restricts vertical agreements, i.e. agreements between endeavors at various levels of the production chain in various markets for products or administrations, which cause or are probably going to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. These remember tie-for arrangements,4 selective supply agreements, select distribution agreements,6 refusals to arrangement, 7 and resale price maintenance, where such agreement causes or is probably going to cause an appreciable adverse effect on competition in India. This standard of evaluation corresponds with the “rule of reason” procedure for separating anti-competitive agreements, which includes changing the negative and positive competition-related effects of an understanding, additionally, on this reason, concluding whether such arrangement has, or is likely going to have, an appreciable adverse effect on competition. The categorization of “resale price maintenance” as a training to be surveyed by a “rule of reason,” investigation follows the American methodology in such a manner and addresses a takeoff from European competition law, under which “resale price maintenance” is treated as a “hardcore restriction” and is dared to confine competition. Vertical or potential restraints on competition, according to Section 3(4) includes-
(a) TIE- IN- ARRANGEMENTS – It includes any agreement requiring a buyer of merchandise, as a condition of such buy, to buy some different products. As such, where the supplier makes the supply of one product conditional upon the buyer buying a distinct, separate product (the tied product). Two products are distinct if, without the tie, the products can be bought from two unique markets. While, if the buyer is compelled to purchase the product from a specific market (because of a tie) this will restrict his accessible options of buying the products. Tie-in arrangements are regularly turned by ventures to utilize the fame of a product to advance the offer of a less well-known product.
(b) EXCLUSIVE SUPPLY AGREEMENTS- It includes any agreement restricting in any way the buyer over the span of his trade from acquiring or in any case dealing in any goods other than those of the vendor or some other person. It is an outrageous type of restricted distribution agreement where the buyer is kept from dealing in/acquiring products from some other person separated from the producer. It restricts the number of buyers to whom a supplier sells its products. Selective supply agreements are common in business life. Subsequently, ‘franchisee agreements’ for the distribution of goods or administrations typically incorporated a condition that the franchisee will not bargain in competing goods. The significant anti-competitive concern with these agreements is that they might dispossess admittance to the market and work with collusion.
(c ) EXCLUSIVE DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS- Where a producer offers his products to a set number of traders, who are typically defined as conceded elite right to sell the products within a domain or to a particular client. it includes any agreement to restrict, limit or retain the yield or supply of any goods or dispense any region or market for the removal or offer of the goods. It resembles a ‘Selective Distribution Agreement’ where vendors are needed to meet certain measures before becoming a piece of the distribution organization. Selective distribution is oftentimes utilized for the distribution of extravagance goods and it prompts maltreatment of dominant position.
(d ) RESALE PRICE MAINTENANCE- Where price restraints are forced on the buyer with regards to the price at which he might sell the product. Thusly, it includes any agreement to sell products for the condition that the prices to be charged on the resale by the purchaser will be the prices determined by the vendor aside from in case it is communicated that prices lower than those prices may be charged. The main anti-competitive concern with such agreements is reduction intra-brand (competition between distributors/retailers of a similar brand) and increased straightforwardness of prices, which might prompt collision at various levels of the supply chain.
CONCLUSION
Despite the fact that competition law is pertinent to every sector still because of social, monetary, or political reasons, exclusions and special cases from the utilization of competition law are made. Award of exclusions doesn’t generally debilitate the authorization of competition. Maybe now and again, it is needed for the more grounded utilization of competition laws. Under the Act, an exemption is made for joint venture agreements [Sec. 3(3), proviso], and, under Sec. 3(5) for the activity of intellectual property rights (IPRs) and export cartels. A joint endeavor (JV) is a strategy wherein like two parties consent to pool their resources to accomplish a specific errand. The possible proficiency and development yield gains related to the shaping of JVs eventually pass the advantages to definite purchasers as marked down prices, more item decisions, and so on. On the opposite side, JVs bring about a portion of the anti-competitive dangers as they can diminish potential competition either between the guardians or between the guardians and the JV. JVs might be utilized as price-fixing. quota fixing, market sharing, or coordination of other competitively touchy arrangements of in any case autonomous parties. A cartel is a gathering of autonomous market members who connive with one another to work on their benefits and overwhelm the market. Cartels can guarantee that their coordination brings about the advancement of specialized, logical, or financial turn of events or certain advantages to the buyers. The courts, nonetheless, have explicitly held that despite the fact that aggregate blasting for proficiency purposes is allowed, yet it can’t happen in the camouflage of an anti-competitive arrangement. Section 3(5) of the Competition Act gives that nothing contained in Section 3 (prohibition of anti-competitive agreements) will limit any individual’s in general right to prevent encroachment or to execute sensible conditions, similar to copyright, trademarks, designs, and geographical indications, that may be fitting for the shield of his/her intellectual property rights.
